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Abstract 
 
This exploratory study examines the role of the audit committee in overseeing information 
technology (IT) risk. We address the degree of audit committee oversight of specific IT risks, as 
well as factors associated with variations in audit committee IT oversight. Based on responses 
from 39 audit committee members, we found (1) little audit committee emphasis on oversight of IT 
risks, (2) audit committees involved with IT oversight focus on more traditional risks (e.g., 
monitoring), while very little attention is devoted to IT acquisition and implementation, and (3) the 
amount of IT oversight is positively associated with the responding members’ auditing experience 
and prior familiarity with the COBIT model for assessing IT risks. Audit committee independence, 
diligence, and expertise, company size, and industry were not significantly associated with IT 
oversight.  
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
ncreased reliance on information technology (IT) exposes companies to a variety of new risks. Managing these 
risks requires the efforts of various parties within the organization, including the board of directors (Horton et 
al. 2000; NACD 2001a). At the board level, the audit committee generally takes the lead in overseeing many 
key business risks (NACD 2000; POB Panel 2000). While expectations of audit committees have risen dramatically 
in recent years (e.g., BRC 1999; NACD 2000; Sarbanes-Oxley 2002), little is known about the audit committee’s 
role in overseeing IT risks. 
 
This preliminary study explores the audit committee’s role in overseeing IT risks. We address the extent to 
which audit committees oversee the IT risk domain, the specific IT risks considered, and the factors associated with 
variations in oversight among audit committees. Using the COBIT model for addressing IT risks, we developed a 
survey to assess audit committee members’ perceptions of their oversight of 34 specific IT risks.  
 
Based on responses from 39 audit committee members, we found (1) little audit committee emphasis on 
oversight of IT risks, (2) audit committees involved with IT oversight focus on more traditional risks (e.g., 
monitoring), while very little attention is devoted to IT acquisition and implementation, and (3) the amount of IT 
oversight is positively associated with the responding members’ auditing experience and prior familiarity with the 
COBIT model for assessing IT risks. 
 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background information and 
our specific research questions. The third section describes our research method. The fourth section presents the 
results, followed by our conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
 
 
 
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
 
I 
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2.0  Background and Research Questions 
 
 Prior research on IT risk identification and assessment has focused on the internal audit function. For 
example, Hermanson et al. (2000) found that internal auditors emphasized traditional IT risks and controls (e.g., 
safeguarding IT assets, processing applications, and ensuring data integrity, privacy and security). Alternatively, 
systems development and acquisition risks received the least attention from internal auditors. The authors found that 
several factors were associated with internal auditors’ IT oversight, including “the nature of the audit objective, the 
prevalence of computer audit specialists on the internal audit staff, and the existence of new computerized systems” 
(39). 
 
IT risk management research at the board level is scarce and limited in scope to a focus on information 
security risks. The National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD 2001a) surveyed corporate directors and 
board advisors to assess companies’ reliance on IT and companies’ experiences with information security breaches. 
The results revealed that many boards address information security, but that there was “room for improvement” 
(NACD 2001a, 3). The participants indicated that approximately half of the companies delegated responsibility for 
information security oversight to the audit committee. While these findings contribute to our understanding of board 
and audit committee oversight in this area, information security represents only one of several IT risks. The role of 
the board and its committees with respect to other IT risks remains unexplored.  
 
As a subcommittee of the board of directors, the audit committee typically is charged with the risk 
oversight function of the corporation (NACD 2000). Specifically with regard to IT risks, the POB Panel on Audit 
Effectiveness (2000, 67) recommends that audit committees “promote candid discussions…on significant 
information system risks, including those related to any specific regulations or issues.”  
 
Although considerable research exists on audit committees (see DeZoort et al. (2002) for a synthesis of the 
literature) and the scope of audit committee oversight (e.g., Wolnizer 1995; DeZoort 1997), no study addresses the 
audit committee’s role in monitoring IT risks. This study provides an initial examination of audit committee 
oversight in the area using the COBIT framework to organize the research. 
 
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT 2000) is a comprehensive framework 
for addressing IT risks that is widely accepted in practice. First released in 1996 by the Information Systems Audit 
and Control Foundation, COBIT combines existing comprehensive business control models (e.g., COSO) with 
specialized IT control models (http://www.isaca.org). The COBIT framework includes 34 high-level control 
objectives and 318 detailed objectives developed through extensive research. COBIT is becoming internationally 
recognized as the authoritative source on IT governance, IT control objectives, and IT audit used in a variety of 
applications by private industry, public accounting firms, governments and academia (Lainhart 2000). 
 
2.1  Research Questions 
 
We address five research questions in this initial study of audit committee oversight of IT risk. First, we 
assess whether audit committees appear to provide any oversight in the IT domain. Second, we assess where audit 
committees focus their attention – for example, on “traditional” IT risks (e.g., monitoring) or on such areas as 
acquisition and implementation of IT. 
 
Third, we evaluate whether audit committee independence, diligence, and expertise are related to 
perceptions of IT risk oversight within audit committees. Prior research on audit committees provides evidence that 
these three focal characteristics can affect audit committee activities and performance (e.g., McMullen and 
Raghunandan 1996; Beasley et al. 2000; DeZoort et al. 2002). 
 
Fourth, we explore the effect of the responding audit committee members’ expertise on perceived oversight 
of IT risks. Prior audit committee research (e.g., DeZoort 1998; DeZoort and Salterio 2001) highlights the 
importance of experience and knowledge on member oversight and task performance.  
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Finally, we explore the effects of company size and industry on perceptions of audit committee oversight of 
IT risk. Prior research on internal controls (e.g., DeAngelo 1981; Ivancevich et al. 1998) addresses the link between 
company size and focus on control, typically finding more extensive controls in larger companies. Researchers (e.g., 
Beasley et al. 2000; Carcello et al. 2002) also have explored industry effects on audit committee activity, finding 
relatively high levels of audit committee activity in industries such as financial services. 
 
Stated formally, the research questions are: 
 
1. To what extent do audit committee members perceive their audit committee provides oversight of IT risks? 
2. Which specific IT risk areas receive the greatest attention from audit committees? 
3. Does perceived audit committee oversight of IT risks vary with the independence, diligence, and/or 
expertise of the audit committee members? 
4. Does perceived audit committee oversight of IT risks vary based on the expertise of the responding audit 
committee members? 
5. Does perceived audit committee oversight of IT risks vary based on company size and industry? 
 
3.0  Method 
 
3.1  Survey 
 
We developed a survey using the 34 high-level control objectives specified in the COBIT model (see 
Appendix). Audit committee members were asked to provide information regarding the largest public company on 
whose audit committee they served. We did not retain information that would allow us to identify the individual 
participants or the companies reflected in their responses. 
 
A majority of the survey questions pertained to the members’ perceptions of their audit committee’s 
involvement in the oversight of IT risk. While the questions were based on the assumption that the audit committee 
provides IT risk oversight, the participants were given the opportunity to state whether the audit committee was 
formally responsible for monitoring this domain. Several questions focused on management’s, the internal auditor’s, 
and the external auditor’s commitment to managing IT risk. In addition, the participants were asked to self-assess 
their qualifications for overseeing IT risk. The survey concluded with a demographics section.
1
 
 
3.2  Sample 
 
The KPMG Audit Committee Institute mailed 1,000 surveys to directors and audit committee members on 
our behalf. A second mailing was sponsored by the Corporate Governance Center.
2
 In an effort to maximize 
response rate, several procedures supported by Dillman (2000) were performed, including (a) offering a copy of the 
results to the participants, (b) using pre-stamped return envelopes and Likert scales to promote responses, and (c) 
having the study sponsored by (and cover letters included from) the KPMG Audit Committee Institute and the 
Corporate Governance Center.  
 
We received 39 usable responses from audit committee members and had 50 sets of materials 
undeliverable. An exact response rate cannot be calculated because the ACI’s confidential mailing list contained a 
mix of “non-audit committee member directors” (not of interest to us) and audit committee members (of interest to 
us). Based on additional information obtained from the ACI, it appears that audit committee members may comprise 
roughly 40% of the 1,000 person list. Accordingly, we estimate our response rate at approximately 10%.
3
  
 
While some audit committee studies in the accounting literature (e.g., Kalbers and Fogarty 1993) have 
experienced response rates over 20%, we believe that the present study’s response is reasonable given the length of 
the survey, the timing of the mailings (i.e., during 2002), and the likelihood of reduced interest because many audit 
committees apparently do not address IT risks in a specific manner. However, we do recognize the important 
potential limitation of the response and believe that the results should be interpreted with caution.
4
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3.3  Model 
 
The following ordinary least-squares regression model is used to address Research Questions 3-5: 
 
ACITOV = f (INDEP, FREQM, ACITEX, YRSAUD, COBEXP, LOGSALES, FINSVCS).  
 
 ACITOV (Audit committee IT oversight). The dependent variable is measured using the COBIT model. 
A scale of 1 (no oversight) to 7 (heavy oversight) is used to assess the audit committee’s perceived role in 
overseeing each of the 34 control objectives. The variable ACITOV is calculated using the mean of the 34 
control objectives (another method is explored later). 
 INDEP (Audit committee independence). This independent variable is measured as the percentage of 
members of the audit committee who are independent, outside directors (i.e., non-management, without 
other affiliations to the company).  
 FREQM (Frequency of audit committee meetings). This independent variable is a measure of board 
diligence and refers to the number of audit committee meetings held in the most recent year as specified in 
the questionnaire.  
 ACITEX (Audit committee IT expertise). This independent variable is a measure of the full audit 
committee’s level of IT expertise. Participants rated fellow audit committee members’ qualifications to 
oversee IT risks on a scale from 1 = not at all qualified to 7 = highly qualified, a perception-based measure.  
 YRSAUD (Years of audit experience). This independent variable measures the responding audit 
committee member’s years of auditing experience. 
 COBEXP (Prior exposure to COBIT model). This independent variable measures the responding audit 
committee member’s prior experience with the COBIT model on a scale from 1 = none to 7 = considerable. 
 LOGSALES (Natural log of sales). This independent variable refers to company size. It is measured as 
the natural log of sales, expressed in millions.  
 FINSVCS (Financial services). This independent variable refers to whether a company is classified within 
the financial services industry (1 = financial services, 0 otherwise).  
 
4.0  Results 
 
4.1  Demographics and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents demographics and descriptive statistics on the model variables. The responding audit 
committee members generally are older males with nine years of audit committee experience. On average, the 
participants currently served on 1.80 audit committees.
5
  
 
On average, audit committee oversight of IT risks appears quite limited (Research Question 1), as the mean 
of ACITOV was 2.38 on a scale from 1 = no oversight to 7 = heavy oversight. Overall, it appears that audit 
committees provide limited oversight of IT risks. 
 
The companies’ audit committees were primarily independent, and the average committee met five times 
per year. The participants rated their fellow audit committee members’ IT expertise as moderate (mean of 3.54 on a 
scale from 1 = not at all qualified to 7 = highly qualified). The participants had an average of 2.97 years of audit 
experience, and most did not have prior familiarity with the COBIT model. 
 
Finally, average revenues for the samples companies were $819 million (mean of LOGSALES was 6.14). 
Thirteen percent of the companies were in the financial services industry. 
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Table 1: Demographics and Descriptive Statistics (n = 39) 
              
Audit committee member age:    
Under 50  13%  
50-59  36%  
60-69  36%  
70 or over  15%  
    
Audit committee member gender  95% male 
5% female 
 
    
Mean total years of audit committee service  9.16  
    
Mean number of audit committees on which participants serve  1.80  
    
Means of model variables:    
ACITOV  2.38  
INDEP  91.56  
FREQM  5.00  
ACITEX  3.54  
YRSAUD  2.97  
COBEXP  1.59  
LOGSALES  6.14  
FINSVCS  0.13  
              
Legend: 
 
ACITOV = Average level of audit committee IT oversight across 34 specific risk areas (scale from 1 = no oversight to 7 = heavy oversight)  
INDEP = Percentage of independent outside directors serving on AC 
FREQM = Number of AC meetings held in the most recent year 
ACITEX = Full audit committee’s level of IT expertise (scale from 1 = not at all qualified to 7 = highly qualified) 
YRSAUD = Responding audit committee member’s years of audit experience 
COBEXP = Responding audit committee member’s prior experience with COBIT (scale from 1 = none to 7 = considerable) 
LOGSALES = Company size measured as the natural log of sales, first expressed in millions 
FINSVCS = 1 if company is classified within financial services industry, else 0 
 
 
4.2  Correlation Matrix 
 
 Table 2 presents a correlation matrix for the model’s dependent and independent variables. Four 
correlations were greater than 0.50. Audit committee IT oversight is positively correlated with the respondents’ prior 
familiarity with COBIT (0.67), the frequency of audit committee meetings (0.52), and audit committee IT expertise 
(0.52). In addition, companies with greater audit committee IT expertise had more frequent audit committee 
meetings (correlation of ACITEX and FREQM was 0.57).
6
 
 
4.3  IT Oversight of Specific Control Objectives 
 
 The Appendix presents the mean rating for each of the 34 control objectives, as well as group means for 
each of the four business processes (Research Question 2). Overall, it appears that audit committees place the 
greatest emphasis on the Monitoring area (overall mean of 3.12) and the least emphasis on Acquisition and 
Implementation (mean of 1.99). This concentration of effort appears consistent with the focus of internal auditors. 
Hermanson et al. (2000) found that internal auditors primarily addressed more traditional IT risks, while systems 
development and acquisition received the least attention. 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix (n = 39) 
 
 ACITOV INDEP FREQM ACITEX YRSAUD COBEXP LOGSALES 
INDEP 0.29       
FREQM 0.52 0.36      
ACITEX 0.52 0.26 0.57     
YRSAUD 0.28 0.06 0.18 0.05    
COBEXP 0.67 0.12 0.46 0.48 -0.05   
LOGSALES 0.17 0.15 0.11 -0.12 0.02 0.26  
FINSVCS 0.39 0.17 0.44 0.19 -0.06 0.45 0.01 
Legend: 
 
ACITOV = Average level of audit committee IT oversight across 34 specific risk areas (scale from 1 = no oversight to 7 = heavy oversight)  
INDEP = Percentage of independent outside directors serving on AC 
FREQM = Number of AC meetings held in the most recent year 
ACITEX = Full audit committee’s level of IT expertise (scale from 1 = not at all qualified to 7 = highly qualified) 
YRSAUD = Audit committee member’s years of audit experience 
COBEXP = Audit committee member’s prior experience with COBIT (scale from 1 = none to 7 = considerable) 
LOGSALES = Company size measured as the natural log of sales, first expressed in millions 
FINSVCS = 1 if company is classified within financial services industry, else 0 
 
 
4.4  Regression Results 
 
 Table 3 presents the results of estimating the OLS regression model (Research Questions 3-5). The model 
has significant explanatory power (adjusted R
2
 = 53%, F = 7.18, p = .00). Two of the independent variables of 
interest (YRSAUD and COBEXP) were significantly related to ACITOV.
7
  
 
 
Table 3  Regression Results, Dependent Variable = ACITOV (n = 39) 
              
      
Variable  Estimate t-stat. p-value  
      
Intercept  0.172 0.17 0.86  
INDEP  0.008 1.11 0.28  
FREQM  0.026 0.24 0.81  
ACITEX  0.116 1.19 0.24  
YRSAUD  0.051 2.47 0.02  
COBEXP  0.498 3.47 0.00  
LOGSALES  0.013 0.10 0.92  
FINSVCS  0.170 0.72 0.48  
      
Model F  7.18    
p-value  0.00    
Adj. R2  0.53    
              
Note: All p-values are two-tailed.  
Legend: 
 
ACITOV = Average level of audit committee IT oversight across 34 specific risk areas (scale from 1 = no oversight to 7 = heavy oversight)  
INDEP = Percentage of independent outside directors serving on AC 
FREQM = Number of AC meetings held in the most recent year 
ACITEX = Full audit committee’s level of IT expertise (scale from 1 = not at all qualified to 7 = highly qualified) 
YRSAUD = Audit committee member’s years of audit experience 
COBEXP = Audit committee member’s prior experience with COBIT (scale from 1 = none to 7 = considerable) 
LOGSALES = Company size measured as the natural log of sales, first expressed in millions 
FINSVCS = 1 if company is classified within financial services industry, else 0  
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First, ACITOV is positively related to the participants’ personal audit experience (YRSAUD, p = 0.02). 
Audit experience may sensitize audit committee members to the importance of risk assessment, particularly risks 
associated with computerized information systems. Such a focus on risks could influence the entire audit committee 
to focus greater attention on oversight of IT risks. 
 
 Second, the responding audit committee members’ prior familiarity with COBIT (COBEXP, p = 0.00) was 
positively associated with ACITOV. This variable may reflect the participants’ exposure to or knowledge of IT risk 
assessment, which may in turn influence the audit committee to focus greater attention on oversight of IT risks. 
 
 None of the other variables was significantly associated with ACITOV. As a result, prior linkages between 
internal control / audit committee oversight and such factors as audit committee independence, diligence, and 
expertise, company size, or industry do not appear to extend to the IT oversight domain. In this context, based on 
this one study, it appears that the responding audit committee members’ expertise and experience are the primary 
factors associated with audit committee IT oversight. 
 
4.5  Other Analyses 
 
 We performed four other analyses related to Table 3. First, the participants indicated whether the audit 
committee was expressly charged with oversight of IT risks. A variable coded 1 = audit committee has formal 
responsibility for IT oversight, 0 otherwise, was added to the model. The results in Table 3 were unaffected, and the 
new variable was not significantly associated with IT oversight (p = 0.70) 
 
 Second, we considered several other measures of the participants’ expertise – self-assessed personal 
qualifications to oversee IT risks, years of IT experience, years of audit committee experience, years of accounting 
experience, and years of director experience. When added to the model, none was significantly related to ACITOV. 
The other results were fairly consistent with those presented in Table 3; however, in two cases the p-value on 
YRSAUD was greater than 0.05 (0.07 in one case and 0.15 in another). The 0.15 level occurred when years of 
accounting experience was added to the model. 
 
 Third, before addressing the 34 COBIT objectives, the participants were asked: (1) “What role does your 
audit committee play in overseeing IT risk?,” and (2) “What role should your AC play in overseeing IT risk?” We 
ran two additional models, replacing ACITOV with the response to each of these questions. In both instances, the 
overall regression model was insignificant (p > 0.05). 
 
Finally, in the COBIT model, the 34 individual control objectives are divided into four business processes 
(see Appendix). As an additional analysis, we ran four regression models, each time replacing the dependent 
variable ACITOV (the mean of the 34 control objectives) with the mean rating within one of the business processes. 
For example, the first model run used the mean of the 11 items in Planning and Organization as the dependent 
variable. YRSAUD and COBEXP each were significantly associated with oversight in three of the four models (p < 
0.06). Overall, it appears that the results within the four business processes are reasonably consistent with the overall 
results presented in Table 3. 
 
5.0  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This exploratory study examined the audit committee’s role in overseeing IT risks. IT risks are a major 
component of risk management because an organization’s information is among its most vital assets and is 
paramount to the organization’s success (Horton et al. 2000). Although considerable research exists on audit 
committees and on IT risk (including a recent NACD study investigating board oversight of information security), 
no study to date addresses audit committee oversight in this domain. 
 
Based on responses from 39 audit committee members, we found (1) little audit committee emphasis on 
oversight of IT risks, (2) audit committees involved with IT oversight focus on more traditional risks (e.g., 
The Review of Business Information Systems                                                                              Volume 7, Number 4 
8 
 
monitoring), while very little attention is devoted to IT acquisition and implementation, and (3) the amount of IT 
oversight is positively associated with the responding members’ auditing experience and prior familiarity with the 
COBIT model for assessing IT risks. Audit committee independence, diligence, and expertise, company size, and 
industry were not significantly associated with IT oversight.  
 
This study has three important limitations. First, this initial study is exploratory. Rigorous future research is 
needed before definitive conclusions can be drawn about the audit committee’s ability and willingness to provide 
effective IT risk oversight. Second, the results of this study rely on the perceptions of the participants regarding one 
of their audit committees’ oversight of IT risk. The participants’ perceptions may not accurately reflect the audit 
committee’s true level of IT oversight. Finally, the relatively small sample size and response limit the ability to 
generalize the extent of audit committee oversight of IT risks.  
 
We encourage additional, large-sample investigations of the role of the audit committee in overseeing IT 
risks. In particular, future research may examine the degree to which audit committees accept responsibility for IT 
oversight, how such committees enhance their IT expertise, and what other factors may be associated with greater IT 
oversight by the audit committee.   
___________________ 
Acknowledgements: We gratefully acknowledge financial and other support from KPMG’s Audit Committee 
Institute and helpful feedback from Scott Reed of KPMG, Joseph Balloun, Mark Beasley, Dan Ivancevich, and John 
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Appendix:   
34 Control Objectives from COBIT Model Sorted by Four Business Processes 
(Scale from 1 = no oversight to 7 = heavy oversight) 
 
Planning And Organization: Includes strategy to identify best IT organization and structure. 
 
Control Objective  Mean Rating 
1. Define a strategic IT plan: includes periodic strategic planning sessions to 
develop short-term operational goals from long-term plans 
 2.64 
2. Define the IT systems: includes an IT model with various systems designed to 
maximize information use 
 2.51 
3. Determine the IT direction: includes an IT plan to attain specific 
technological products, services, and delivery systems 
 2.64 
4. Define the IT organization and relationships: includes ideal size skilled 
organization with clearly defined and communicated individual roles and 
responsibilities subject to company strategy and control  
 2.69 
5. Manage the IT investment: includes the development and approval of an IT 
budget 
 2.59 
6. Communicate IT management aims and directions: includes communication 
of policies including specific standards to facilitate practical use 
 2.33 
7. Manage IT human resources: includes fair and transparent IT personnel 
management practices (e.g., recruitment, training, promoting, etc.) 
 2.00 
8. Ensure compliance with external IT requirements: includes compliance with 
external requirements relevant to IT  
 3.32 
9. Assess IT risks: includes IT risk-identification and analysis; subsequently 
reducing risk subject to cost / benefit criteria 
 3.44 
10. Manage IT projects: includes prioritizing projects and use of project 
management techniques  
 2.05 
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11. Manage IT quality: within established quality management standards 
including clearly defined deliverables and responsibilities 
 2.28 
Business Process Mean  2.59 
  
ACQUISITION AND IMPLEMENTATION: Represents identified IT solutions developed or purchased and 
implemented to meet IT objectives. 
 
Control Objective  Mean Rating 
1. Identify IT automated solutions: identify and analyze IT alternatives against 
user requirements 
 1.67 
2. Acquire and maintain applications software: designed to meet specific user 
objectives possibly phased-in based upon clearly defined deliverables 
 2.05 
3. Acquire and maintain IT systems: includes hardware and software 
acquisition, standardizing of software, evaluation of hardware and software 
performance, and consistent system administration 
 2.13 
4. Develop and maintain IT procedures: systematic development of necessary 
IT manuals, service requirements and training materials 
 2.15 
5. Install and accredit IT systems: an organizational plan to get the IT system up 
and running 
 1.92 
6. Manage IT changes: a plan to facilitate IT changes including feed-back 
monitoring and follow-up  
 
 2.03 
Business Process Mean  1.99 
  
DELIVERY AND SUPPORT: Includes required IT services primarily relating to IT security and continued 
training, need to set up support, and actual processing of data by application systems. 
 
Control Objective  Mean Rating 
1. Define and manage IT service levels: formal service agreements indicating 
required quantity and quality of service 
 1.90 
2. Manage IT third-party services: control procedures to determine effectiveness 
of existing IT agreements based upon organizational policy 
 2.08 
3. Manage IT performance and capacity: relates to measuring system utilization 
and satisfaction of demand 
 2.10 
4. Ensure IT systems security: relates to controls designed to limit access to 
systems, data, and programs to authorized users  
 3.21 
5. Identify and allocate IT costs: a cost accounting system designed to accurately 
record and allocate IT costs based upon service provided 
 2.05 
6. Educate and train IT users: a comprehensive IT training and development plan  1.90 
7. Assist and advise IT customers: a help desk facility providing IT support and 
advice 
 1.77 
8. Manage the IT inventory: controls which identify and record all IT hardware 
and software along with their physical location 
 1.92 
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9. Manage IT problems and incidents: the recording of all IT problems or 
incidents 
 2.21 
10. Manage IT data: an effective combination of application and general controls 
over IT operations 
 2.05 
11. Manage IT facilities: includes IT environmental and physical controls regularly 
reviewed to determine proper functioning 
 2.10 
12. Manage IT operations: schedule of activities required  1.82 
13. Ensure continuous service: making IT services available upon request, 
including a disaster recovery plan 
 
 3.03 
Business Process Mean  2.16 
 
MONITORING: The assessment of IT quality and compliance with control requirements over time. 
 
Control Objective  Mean Rating 
1. Monitor the IT process: identification of relevant IT performance indicators, 
systematic and timely reporting of performance and prompt follow-up on 
deviations 
 2.72 
2. Assess IT internal control adequacy: commitment to monitoring IT internal 
controls, assessing their effectiveness at regular reporting intervals 
 3.51 
3. Obtain IT independent assurance: independent IT assurance reviews carried 
out at regular intervals 
 2.92 
4. Provide for IT independent audit: independent IT audits carried out at regular 
intervals, separate from financial audit 
 
 3.33 
Business Process Mean  3.12 
 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The survey was pretested on academics and practitioners and revised based on their comments. 
2 The addition of an early/late response variable to the model has no effect on the results presented in Table 3. The early/late 
variable is not significant (p = 0.78). 
3 Several recent surveys of directors or audit committee members have had limited responses. For example, in gathering data for 
its 2001 – 2002 NACD Public Company Governance Survey (NACD 2001b), NACD mailed surveys to “CEOs, directors, and 
executive officers of all U.S. publicly held companies [approximately 15,000 companies].” NACD received 280 responses, 
reflecting 1.9% of the public companies. Similarly, KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute gathered data for its Audit Committee 
Survey 2000 (KPMG 2000) in conjunction with Corporate Board Member magazine. KPMG mailed over 5,000 surveys and 
realized a 4.1% response rate. Finally, McKinsey & Company recently collaborated with Directorship magazine in gathering data 
for its Director Opinion Survey 2002 (McKinsey 2002). McKinsey “sent surveys to about 2,000 directors, getting responses from 
nearly 200,” a response rate of just under 10%. 
4 Some may argue that audit committee members most likely to respond to the present survey would be those whose audit 
committees are doing the most to oversee IT risks. If so, our results could overstate the typical audit committee’s IT oversight 
efforts. Despite this potential bias, the Results section discloses relatively low oversight levels among the responding audit 
committees. 
5 Four participants did not indicate the number of audit committees currently served (although all indicated several years of audit 
committee experience). The results are unaffected if these four individuals are deleted. Also, one participant responded regarding 
only 33 of the 34 control objectives. Deletion of this individual has no effect on the results. 
6 The variance inflation factors all are less than 2.10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a significant concern. 
7 We recognize that it would be more desirable to have a sample size closer to 10 observations per independent variable. A 
reduced model, ACITOV = f (YRSAUD, COBEXP), yields consistent results. 
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Notes 
